It always starts with one. In May 2021, a member of the ruling party in Mozambique, the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), proposed altering the constitution to permit President Felipe Nyusi to run for a third term in 2024. This amendment would allow Nyusi to extend his rule, beyond the current constitutionally permitted two terms, until 2030.
Since the proposal in 2021, there has been increasing speculation that Nyusi will pursue a third term. While he has not publicly announced his intention to seek a third term, Nyusi has not denied it, nor has he squashed the persistent rumors. In September 2022, Nyusi was re-elected as FRELIMO party president in an uncontested election with 100 percent of the vote. Since then, leaders of FRELIMO’s youth league and Nyusi supporters have become increasingly vocal in their support for a third term.
President Nyusi’s supporters have offered a variety of arguments as to why constitutional restraints and term limits should be removed. First, they assert that the government’s ongoing campaign against Islamic-state insurgency groups in the northern province of Cabo Delgado justifies an extension of power. His supporters argue that if Nyusi was replaced with a new president, it would risk worsening the conflict. However, the Mozambican government is unable to provide security and relies on the Rwandese army [MP1] since 2021. Second, Nyusi supporters claim that the likely resumption of liquified natural gas exploration projects in the Rovuma Basin – with the assistance of major foreign energy companies, such as ExxonMobil, Eni, and TotalEnergies – provides further justification.
Others assert that the plethora of challenges Nyusi has faced while in office further justify receiving a third term. These include the economic crisis triggered by COVID-19 and the US$2 billion hidden loan corruption scandal that led to a debt crisis. But there are allegations that Nyusi may have been involved in the largest corruption scandal in Mozambique. Nyusi supporters also contend that his landslide reelection victory in the 2019 presidential elections further demonstrates that there is widespread public support for him to remain in office. Of course, the 2019 election was in fact marred with allegations of fraud, so the legitimacy of the margin of the victory is questionable.
The emerging situation in Mozambique mirrors a concerning trend in many countries across the African continent – namely, the weaponization of constitutional modifications to overcome term limits and the casting aside of democratic safeguards. These constitutional coups erode democratic norms and can derail a country’s economic growth, leading to greater instability and the entrenchment of “presidents for life.” These seizures of power have occurred in countries such as Uganda, Burundi, the DR Congo, Cameroon, Guinea, Rwanda, and Côte d’Ivoire, where democratic institutions are less resilient and the cost of pursuing a third presidential term relatively low. These leaders faced little resistance from an international community that continues to prioritize stability as well as combating extremism and eliminating military coups on the continent. This silence, therefore, has abetted the democratic backsliding.
Ironically, some of the African leaders who have successfully executed a constitutional coup serve as key stakeholders in regional institutions that are meant to uphold democracy. These roles burnished these leaders’ international images and confer a sense of protection, credibility, and legitimacy. Last year, Senegal and the Côte d’Ivoire prevented the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) from revising its Democratic Protocol to require all member states to have a two-term presidential limit. The commandeering of the leadership of these critical institutions has impeded the development of regional democratic norms that could inhibit these seizures of power in the future.
While these are worrying trends, Nyusi’s path to securing a third presidential term is not a foregone conclusion. The year leading up to FRELIMO’s party nomination in 2024 will be crucial and will determine whether Mozambique follows the example of recent constitutional coups in the region. Nyusi’s control over his party is perceived to be tenuous and founded in patronage. Therefore, even though the FRELIMO party has a two-third majority in parliament, it is unclear whether Nyusi has the political capital to persuade FRELIMO’s Central Committee and parliamentary majority to change the constitution to allow him to seek a third term.
Furthermore, while careful to present a unified public front, there are FRELIMO party members who are opposed to Nyusi extending his stay in power. On the other hand, the party has also demonstrated a willingness to silence public dissent by party members. For example, former energy minister and member of the FRELIMO Central Committee, Castigo Langa, was recently disavowed by FRELIMO for his statements urging Nyusi to not seek a third term. Nyusi also faces pushback from the opposition parties, Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) and Movimento Democrático de Moçambique (MDM).
Mozambican civil society and public opinion are also opposed to attempts to Nyusi’s ambitions. A 2021 Afrobarometer survey showed that more than 60 percent of citizens do not approve of a third presidential term for Nyusi, representing an eight percent increase from 2015. An attempt to seek a third presidential term could provoke protests and violence among segments of the Mozambican population who associate Nyusi and the FRELIMO party with abuses of power, corruption, and a lack of delivery on economic opportunities. Recently, young people have organized small public marches and protests, and public discontent has become more visible under the slogan “Povo no Poder” [MP2] (power to the people).
The outcome of an attempt by Nyusi to seek a third presidential term will be an important determinant of Mozambique’s future. A third term would diminish confidence in democratic norms and governmental accountability. It will have significant ramifications for citizen security – defying the will of the people, for instance, could be a recruiting message for the insurgents in northern Mozambique or lead to mass protests and instability. The well-being of the economy is also at stake, as a departure from democratic norms will signal to the investment community that Mozambique is not committed to the rule of law. To be blunt, Mozambicans cannot afford more economic and security uncertainty: the country is the sixth poorest in the world.
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index Rankings and Freedom House’s Freedom in the World, Mozambique’s democratic quality as well as the country’s respect for political rights and civil liberties have consistently declined since Nyusi assumed the presidency in 2015. And examples from across the continent have shown that the pursuit of a third term is a slippery slope, often the first consequential step towards a descent into authoritarianism. FRELIMO’s recent announcement to amend the Constitution to cancel district elections in 2024 does little to dispel fears of democratic erosion and reflects the party’s willingness to use constitutional amendments to circumvent democratic institutions.
Whether Mozambicans are able to resist democratic backsliding will be contingent on many factors. But the strength of civil society, the free press, opposition parties, and FRELIMO party members who are committed to democracy and not an individual will loom especially large. It is up to this collection of citizens to defend Mozambique’s democratic norms and institutions.
Steven Holmes is a Master of Arts in International Relations Candidate at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Follow him on Twitter: @StevenHolmes34
Jeffrey Smith is the Founding Director of Vanguard Africa and the Vanguard Africa Foundation. You can follow him on Twitter at @Smith_JeffreyT.